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CALIFORNIA'S WRIT OF IMMEDIATE
POSSESSION: LANDLORDS AND THE
COURTS V. THE INDIGENT TENANT
The California State Legislature in August of 1969 amended
section 1166(a) 1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. A tenant
is now permitted a court hearing before a writ of immediate posses-
sion may be issued for his eviction. 2 The statute, prior to the present
amendment, permitted the landlord to have a tenant evicted by
means of an ex parte proceeding. The landlord, in a verified com-
plaint, was required to allege that the tenant was either insolvent,
or did not have sufficient property subject to execution to satisfy the
damages sought by the plaintiff, or was out of state or was evading
service of process. If convinced by the complaint, the court would
issue a writ of immediate possession without hearing testimony on
behalf of the defendant.3 The new statute requires, before a writ of
1 Cal. Stats., 1969, ch. 903, § 1, at 1659-60 (1969), amending, Cal. Stats., 1951,
ch. 1737, § 157, at 4140 (1951) (Codified at CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166(a) (West
1955)) [Hereinafter cited as CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv.
1969)]. "Upon filing the complaint the plaintiff may, upon motion, have immediate
possession of the premises by a writ of possession issued by the court and directed
to the sheriff of the county, or constable or marshal, for execution, where it appears
to the satisfaction of the court, after a hearing on the motion, from the verified
complaint and from any affidavits filed or oral testimony given by or on behalf of the
parties, that the defendant is insolvent, or has no property that is subject to execu-
tion sufficient to satisfy the amount of damages sought to be recovered by the
plaintiff, or resides out of the state, or has departed from the state, or cannot, after
due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself to avoid the service of
summons. Written notice of the hearing on the motion must be served on the de-
fendant by the plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of Section 1011, and must
inform the defendant that he may file affidavits on his behalf with the court and may
appear and present testimony on his behalf, that if he fails to appear the plaintiff
will apply to the court for the writ of possession. The plaintiff shall file an under-
taking with good and sufficient sureties, to be approved by the judge, in such sum
as shall be fixed and determined by said judge, to the effect that if the plaintiff
shall fail to recover judgment against the defendant for the possession of said premises,
or if the suit be dismissed, that plaintiff will pay to defendant such damages, not to
exceed the amount fixed in said undertaking, as may be sustained by the defendant
by reason of such dispossession under said writ of possession. An action to recover
such damages shall be commenced by the defendant in a court of competent jurisdiction
within one year from the date of entry of dismissal or of final judgment in favor
of the defendant."
2 Id.
3 Cal. Stats., 1951, ch. 1737, § 157, at 4140 (1951) (Codified at CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 1166(a) (West 1955)) as amended, Cal. Stats., 1969, ch. 903, § 1, at 1659-60
(1969). "Upon filing the complaint the plaintiff may have immediate possession of
the premises by a writ of possession issued by the judge and directed to the sheriff
of the county, or constable or marshal, for execution, where it appears to the satis-
faction of the judge, from the verified complaint, or from an affidavit filed by or on
behalf of the plaintiff, that the defendant is insolvent, or has no property that is
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immediate possession may be issued, that there be an opportunityfor a hearing attended by the defendant at which he may produce
testimony and file affidavits on his behalf. The new statute appears
to contain several procedural deficiencies which effectually vitiateits purpose. After a short background introduction, these deficiencies
will be discussed in detail. As this statute has been used primarily
to evict lower income tenants who have difficulty meeting their rental
commitments, this comment is necessarily concerned throughout
with the effects upon the indigent tenant.
SECTION 1166(a) BEFORE AMENDMENT
Under the old common law a landlord could either use self-help
or force to evict a tenant who was wrongfully holding over. This
rule, however, proved to be harsh, and most jurisdictions have
ameliorated this process by enacting forcible entry and detainer
statutes. These statutes force the landlord to bring an action in
ejectment, thereby permitting the tenant to answer charges of un-lawful detainer in a court of law. Later statutes gave the tenant a
cause of action in the event the tenant was wrongfully evicted.4 TheCalifornia legislature enacted forcible entry and detainer statutes as
early as 1872.' These California statutes provided for actions in un-lawful detainer which take precedence over all other civil actions,
"[E]xcept actions to which special precedence is given by law .... ,,Moreover, the legislature elected in 1939 to give the landlord thelegal power to have the tenant summarily evicted, under certainprescribed circumstances, without an opportunity for a hearing
attended by the tenant. Evictions could be accomplished in as little
as four days.7 The objective of this statute must have been a belief
subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the amount of damages sought to be re-
covered by the plaintiff, or resides out of the State, or has departed from the State,or cannot, after due diligence be found within the State, or conceals himself to avoidthe service of summons. The plaintiff shall file an undertaking with good and sufficient
sureties, to be approved by the judge, in such sum as shall be fixed and determinedby said judge, to the effect that if the plaintiff shall fail to recover judgment againstthe defendant for the possession of said premises, or if the suit be dismissed, thatplaintiff will pay to defendant such damages, not to exceed the amount fixed in saidundertaking, as may be sustained by the defendant by reason of such dispossession
under said writ of possession. An action to recover such damages shall be commencedby the defendant in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year from thedate of entry of dismissal or of final judgment in favor of the defendant."4 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.1-3.55 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). For anexcellent historical analysis of England's forcible entry and detainer statutes, see City
of Chicago v. Chicago Steamship Lines, 328 Ill. 309, 159 N.E. 301 (1927).
5 CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §§ 1159-60 (West 1955).
6 Id.§ 1179(a).
7 Id. §J 1161, 1166 & 1167.
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that the landlord needed more protection than was provided by un-
lawful detainer actions.8 The legislature undoubtedly meant well,
but the effect was a vast over-protection of the landlord vis-h-vis the
tenant. This was especially true in relation to the indigent tenant,
who soon bore the brunt of the 1939 statute. The issue of the under-
protected tenant has become one of first magnitude in the United
States, especially since in most urban areas there is a housing
shortage.9
Statutory over-protection of landlords was recently commented
upon by United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas
in a stinging criticism of the failure of the courts and legislatures to
realize and act upon this widespread problem.' The Georgia statute,
on which Justice Douglas commented, required a tenant to post a
bond before there could be a hearing on the merits of the eviction
proceedings." This requirement is literally impossible for the in-
digent tenant to meet. He is thus deprived of his place of residence
without due process of law, and is deprived of equal protection un-
der the law.'"
The 1939 California statute is analagous to the Georgia statute
in that under California law the tenant may be evicted without a
hearing. Clearly, the statute violated the constitutional guarantee of
8 "This section undoubtedly resulted from the rather widespread feeling in the
State that the ordinary means of obtaining such possession by an unlawful detainer
action often was inadequate and permitted a tenant who was insolvent nevertheless
to retain possession of the premises for an unreasonable time. . . ." Howell, The
Work of the 1937 California Legislature, 11 S. CAL. L. REV. 30, 31 (1937) [Here-
inafter cited as 11 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1937)].
9 Telephone interview with Ray R. Davis, Occupancy Analyst, Santa Clara
County Housing Authority, Nov. 5, 1969. Mr. Davis stated that there was a waiting
list of over nine hundred persons seeking housing through their organization as of
the date of the interview.
Telephone interview with Jack Bell, Area Representative, California Department
of Housing and Community Development, Nov. 13, 1969. Mr. Bell informed the
author that there is a statewide study under way at this time regarding housing
shortages in California. From the information thus far gathered the opinion of Mr.
Bell is that there is a tremendous housing shortage for all lower income groups in
California, especially in highly urbanized areas.
10 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967), denying cert. to 222 Ga. 334, 149
S.E.2d 668 (1966). A tenant brought a suit to enjoin his eviction, alleging a violation
of due process of law and a denial of equal protection under the law. GA. CODE ANN.
tit. 61, § 303 (1966) requires a posting of a bond to contest eviction proceedings.
The state courts upheld the statute, but the Supreme Court refused to grant a
hearing. Since the tenant had already been evicted, the question was moot. Justice
Douglas dissented vigorously. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
11 GA. CODE ANN. tit. 61, § 303 (1966).
12 See Recent Developments, 20 STAN. L. REV. 766 (1968).
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due process of law,1 and was, in fact, held unconstitutional by two
California Municipal Courts. 4
The right to be heard prior to court action is not absolute in allcases. When public necessity requires, action may precede a hearing
on the merits.' 5 For example, the Insurance Commissioner may seizeinsurance company assets if he believes a hazardous condition exists
which jeopardizes the future of the company and the seizure isnecessary for the benefit of the public.' 6 Also, action may precede
a hearing where there is a clear necessity to act immediately for thebenefit of the community at large. A public official may be justifiedin destroying a private citizen's property if a clear necessity exists,'"
such as to stop a raging fire from spreading for the benefit of thepublic at large. It must be understood, however, that the cases ofpublic necessity are exceptions rather than the rule.
In most instances due process requires a hearing on the meritsbefore the court is allowed to act regarding the conflicting interests
of the parties. In Ownbey v. Morgan,'18 the defendant was indebtedto the plaintiff in an amount exceeding $50.00. Defendant resided
out of the state but owned some stock which was located in theplaintiff's state of domicile. The plaintiff initiated proceedings to
collect the debt and had this stock attached. According to Delawarelaw the out-of-state defendant had to post a $200,000 bond beforehe was entitled to answer the complaint.'9 The defendant answered
the complaint and alleged that it was impossible to post such a bond
as all of his assets were under attachment. The Delaware courts
upheld the state law and disallowed defendant's answer. Defendant's
stock was taken without the defendant having had a chance to
13 Cf., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "The funda-mental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. . . .This rightto be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter ispending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce orcontest." Id. at 314. See also, 11 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1937); Recent Developments,
supra note 12.
14 Dillon v. Cockrell, No. 109588 (San Francisco Municipal Court, Sept. 1937);Housing Authority v. Salas, No. 117629 (San Jose Municipal Court, Oct. 1969);Interviews with Steve Manley, Chief Counsel, East San Jose Legal Aid Society, atSan Jose, California, Sept. 22, 1969; Oct. 2, 1969; Oct. 27, 1969. Mr. Manley repre-
sented defendant Salas in the above action.15 Financial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 395, 289 P.2d 233(1955); see also Rhode Island Ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 Cal. App. 2d 220, 212 P.2d
965 (1949).
16 Id.
17 Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
18 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
19 DEL. REV. 'CODE § 4123(b) (1915), as amended, 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 3515(1953), repealed, 52 DEL. LAWS, ch. 341, § 1 (1960).
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answer the complaint. The United States Supreme Court held this
state practice unconstitutional and laid the groundwork for re-
quiring a hearing before court action in order to preserve the parties'
rights under the due process clause.' The California Supreme Court
has recognized that an action in unlawful detainer is not the type
of public necessity which requires court action followed by a hearing.
In Mendoza v. Small Claims Court,21 the court said:
Public necessity does not demand action before hearing in this proceed-
ing by a landlord to regain possession of leased premises. Nor can there
be any doubt that possession of a tenant is a substantial right. The right
to retain property already in possession is as sacred as the right to re-
cover it, when dispossessed.
22
The United States Supreme Court has recently acted to declare a
prejudgment attachment of a portion of one's earnings to be a
violation of due process of law and therefore unconstitutional.'
If it is a violation of due process to take a portion of one's earnings
without a hearing, it should follow logically that one's place of resi-
dence cannot be taken without a hearing. 24 The family dwelling,
more than anything else, is what holds the family unit together.
25
This principle has long been recognized by other jurisdictions.26
20 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110, 111 (1921). "The due process clause
does not impose upon the states a duty to establish ideal systems for the administra-
tion of justice. . . . It restrains state action, whether legislative, executive, or judicial,
within bounds that are consistent with the fundamentals of individual liberty and
private property, including the right to be heard where liberty or property is at
stake in judicial proceedings."
21 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958).
22 Id. at 672, 321 P.2d at 12 (emphasis added).
23 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1969). See also Comment,
Due Process and Prejudgment Attachment in California, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 99
(1969).
24 Letter from California Assemblyman James A. Hayes to California Governor
Ronald Reagan, July 31, 1969. "The existing law on this subject is clearly defective
and would likely be stricken down by the United States Supreme Court as uncon-
stitutional because it provides for the obtaining of such a writ of possession before
a hearing on the matter."
25 Interview with Martin H. LeFevre, Captain Santa Clara County Sheriff's
Department, Civil Division, at San Jose, Oct. 23, 1969. Captain LeFevre indicated
to the author that the Sheriff's Department has long been aware of the tremendous
hardship imposed upon indigent tenants who are evicted. The Santa Clara County
Sheriff's Department feels that if it can help these families find suitable housing
and keep the family unit together the ultimate job of the enforcement officials will
become easier. As a result, the Sheriff's Department has a Community Relations
Department which helps evicted tenants, as well as other persons who come into con-
tact with the Department, in any way in which it can. The Sheriff's Department
cannot help these evicted persons directly, as it is its job to evict them, but it
can, and does, help them indirectly by referring the tenants to the Community Rela-
tions Department. Captain LeFevre feels that if this type of organization will help
make the populace more aware of the role and duties of the Sheriff's Department, then
the Department's work can be carried out more smoothly.
20 Hall v. Byrne, 63 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1946). The court stated that the equities
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Enlightened jurisdictions such as New York and Illinois both re-quire a final judgment before a warrant for eviction may be issued,
and Illinois specifically gives the tenant a right to a jury trial.2 7The California courts allow criminals, both suspected and convicted,
more legal protection of their property than the indigent tenanthas heretofore received regarding his leasehold interest."
SECTION 1166(a) AS AMENDED
After thirty years, the California State Legislature has finally
realized that allowing writs of immediate possession without ahearing attended by the defendant would be grossly unfair to the
evicted tenant. On August 27, 1969, the legislature amended the
statute to provide for a hearing prior to issuance of the writ.'
Legislative Intent
The amendment was proposed by the Apartment House Asso-
ciation of California." The Association felt that the unamended stat-
ute raised serious constitutional questions. The Association also feltthat if the old statute was used by attorneys representing landlords,
this might later leave the landlord open to possible suits for damagesfrom tenants evicted pursuant to the writ of immediate possession.The fear was heightened by the possibility of Legal Aid and PovertyProgram attorneys challenging the original statute on constitutionalgrounds. In a recent letter, the attorney for the Apartment House
Association of California stated:
There has recently been a meeting before the presiding judge of theMunicipal Court in San Francisco in which the Legal Aid and Poverty
actually required the issuance of an order of possession by the landlord, but therewas no housing readily available to the tenant. The court gave the tenant an exten-sion until housing could be located, saying in part: "The States' chief business is orshould be the preservation of the family for without the family there can be nostate. The family has a right to existence as a unit. Every effort should be made tofacilitate the realization of that primary right." Id. at 763.27 N.Y. REAL PRoPER Y ACTIONS AND PROCEDURE § 749 (McKinney 1966). IL,.STAT. ANN. ch. 57, §§ 1-22 (Smith-Hurd 1951). See also Greenberg v. Cagle, 212N.Y.S.2d 767 (1961). "A warrant issued in a summary proceeding without a finalorder first having been made in favor of the landlord is a nullity." Id. at 769.28 People v. Lawrence, 140 Cal. App. 2d 133, 295 P.2d 4 (1956); Modern LoanCo. v. Police Court, 12 Cal. App. 582, 108 P. 56 (1910). See also Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 12.29 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv. 1969) note 1 supra.SI Form letter from James A. Hayes to Jeffrey Green, Oct. 12, 1969. Explana-tion of Assembly Bill #1862, which California Assemblyman Hayes introduced.
"Under existing law a landlord may by affidavit obtain an ex parte order grantinghim a writ of possession. . . . To correct this, the Apartment House Association ofCalifornia is supporting this bill."
1969]
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Program lawyers have claimed they are going to challenge the constitu-
tionality of this section .... In view of the prevailing judicial tempera-
ment on all matters of constitutional or civil rights ...we might be
wise to seek an amendment of this statute .... I find that they [attor-
neys for landlords] . . . very seldom use this statute ...because of
course if you put the man out with a writ on filing the complaint and 
he
later prevails you have certainly opened the landlord up to a pretty
nasty suit for damages.a'
The writ of possession appears to be used more often than is
indicated by the Apartment House Association of California, at
least in the Santa Clara Valley. The Santa Clara County Sheriff's
Department served well over six hundred eviction notices during
the year 1968.3 The writ of immediate possession accounted for
approximately seven percent of that total.
8 While the number
evicted by the writ was small in proportion to the total number
evicted, the process nevertheless imposes an extreme hardship on
those evicted and should not be considered lightly. Using the writ
only once would be once too often.
As an example of sentiment in the community regarding the
use of the writ of immediate possession the San Jose Housing Author-
ity, upon a motion by board member Walter Rector, severely criti-
cized its attorney for using this method to attempt the eviction of
a tenant renting from the Housing Authority.
4 Walter Rector, who
is also a landlord, proposed the motion to censure the attorney,
objecting to the writ on the grounds that it was both morally rep-
rehensible and diametrically opposed to all standards 
of fair play. "1 5
The Apartment House Association of California is convinced
that section 1166(a) as amended will increase the use of the writ
as a means of eviction.36 Members of the state assembly also support
this view.87 The consensus of opinion during the committee hearings
31 Letter from Orville C. Pratt IV, attorney for Apartment House Association
of California, to Tes L. Giammugnani, Legislative Counsel for California Assemblyman
James A. Hayes, July 23, 1968 (emphasis added).
82 Interview, note 25 supra.
33 This information is kept on special charts on a quarterly basis by the Civil
Division of the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department. Id.
84 East San Jose Sun, Oct. 29, 1969, at 6, cols. 4-8.
85 Telephone interview with Walter Rector, Board member, San Jose Housing
Authority, Oct. 31, 1969.
86 Letter, note 31 supra. "It would seem to me such an amendment would satisfy
due process under our constitutional guarantees by allowing such a motion to be
heard after notice and an opportunity to the tenants had been given, say, within
five days and in effect possibly improve all our situations on unlawful detainers
because if the motion were granted it would probably be unnecessary to proceed
to trial and get a judgment we wouldn't collect anyway. .... "
87 Telephone interview with Herb Nobriga, Legislative Assistant to California
Assemblyman James A. Hayes, at San Jose, Oct. 22, 1969.
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on the proposed legislation was that with the removal of the fear of
unconstitutionality, this process of eviction would come into common
use.88 One of the primary goals of the legislature in passing the
amendment was to reduce the number of unlawful detainer actions
in the already congested courts by a simple motion for a hearing
and writ of immediate possession. Whether the new statute will
achieve this goal is doubtful, for it contains some serious procedural
defects which may defeat its intended purpose. If these procedural
problems are not rectified it may take as long, if not longer, to
obtain a writ of immediate possession than to obtain a final judg-
ment in an unlawful detainer action.
The Statute
The new statute, unlike the old, provides the tenant with an
opportunity to have a hearing before the writ of immediate posses-
sion will issue.89 Plaintiff must serve notice of the impending hearing
upon defendant. If the defendant should default at this hearing the
plaintiff may then apply for the writ. 0 The new statute requires
the plaintiff to give the defendant notice of the hearing4' but is
silent as to the length of time between the delivery of notice and
the hearing.
The old statute permitted the landlord to file a verified com-
plaint alleging that the tenant was insolvent. The amendment allows
the tenant a hearing to determine whether he is solvent, but it is
vague as to the degree of solvency the tenant must establish. It is
not clear whether the tenant must show solvency for the entire
amount of damages the landlord prays for, or if the measure of
solvency is merely the amount of rent due the landlord. Previous
California law disallowed counterclaims and cross-complaints in
unlawful detainer actions.42 The amendment, while providing for
a hearing, does not address itself to whether the tenant can raise
issues to mitigate his debt to the landlord.
Under both the old and the new statute, the landlord must
38 Id.
89 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv. 1969) note 1 supra.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 145, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915), where the
court said, "It appears to be thoroughly established . . . that neither a counterclaim
nor cross-complaint of any kind is permissible in an action in unlawful detainer ....
There is no distinction in the authorities between cases where the subject-matter of
the attempted counterclaim or cross-complaint arises out of a violation of the terms
of the lease upon which the action is brought, and other cases. . . ." See also, Telegraph
Avenue Corp. v. Raentsch, 205 Cal. 93, 269 P. 1109 (1928); Knight v. Black, 19 Cal.
App. 518, 126 P. 512 (1912).
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post a bond to cover any damages the tenant would suffer should
the tenant prevail in a later proceeding. With a hearing now re-
quired the tenant may be entitled to produce evidence to prove his
damages should he be wrongfully evicted.
In unlawful detainer actions the judge may, at his discretion,
stay the proceedings pending an appeal.43 If the judge should decide
to stay the proceedings after this hearing until a final determination
is made in the unlawful detainer action then the defendant must
post a bond."' If the indigent tenant cannot post such a bond, he
is denied this stay. This denial would raise the constitutional issue
of whether the defendant was afforded equal protection under the
law. Defendant could not directly appeal the decision of the judge
at the hearing because it is not a final determination of the matter.
4 5
The question then arises whether a writ of prohibition would lie
to stay the proceedings, as defendant could not post a bond and
there would be no adequate remedy at law.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Notice of Hearing
Generally, the only justification for a writ of immediate posses-
sion is that it gives the landlord an opportunity to regain his
premises without undue delay, that is, before he can obtain posses-
sion by a final judgment in an unlawful detainer action. If this
prime ingredient of promptness is vitiated, then the statute is mean-
ingless. Section 1166(a) as amended requires the plaintiff to serve
notice of the impending hearing on defendan4 in conformance with
section 1011 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 7 However,
section 1011 merely recites the physical requirements of delivery
of notice but is silent as to the time required between delivery of
notice and the hearing. 8
43 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1176 (West 1955).
44 Id. § 917.4.
45 Id. § 904.1-904.3.
46 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv. 1969) note 1 supra.
47 Id.
48 CAL. CODE Clv. PROC. § 1011 (West 1955). "The service may be personal, by
delivery to the party or attorney on whom the service is required to he made, or it
may be as follows: .... 2. If upon a party, it shall be made in the manner specif-
ically provided in particular cases, or, if no specific provision is made, it may be made
by leaving the notice or other paper at his residence, between the hours of eight in
the morning and six in the evening, with some person of not less than 18 years of age;
if at the time of attempted service between the said hours no such person can be
found at his residence, the same may be served by mail; and, if his residence is not
known, then by delivering the same to the clerk of the court or the judge, if there be
no clerk, for such party."
[Vol. 10
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Since the new statute does not prescribe a length of time for
notice, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, a general
notice statute for motions, should govern.49 According to section
1005, when a written notice of a motion is required, as under section
1166(a), at least ten days must elapse before the proposed hearing
is to take place. However, the judge has the discretion to shorten
this period." In some instances the courts allow a shortening of
the notice period required by giving that particular cause of action
precedence over other types of litigation. For example, eminent
domain proceedings often receive precedence over other matters in
civil litigation.5 The rationale is that eminent domain proceedings
are instituted for the benefit of the public, and that issues which
affect the public at large should be adjudicated without undue delay.
Proceedings in unlawful detainer actions also take precedence over
other civil actions.52 Here the rationale is that a landlord should
have a speedy remedy available to him in order to regain his premises
from one wrongfully holding over. A survey taken of the Los Angeles,
Sacramento and San Jose Municipal Courts indicates that the
average time which elapses between the filing of defendant's answer
and the trial date in unlawful detainer actions is seven days.53
The average time to trial date appears to be approximately thirteen
days from service of the notice to pay or quit.
The question raised by the statute's failure to express a length
of time for notice is whether the landlord will be able to obtain his
premises any sooner under the new statute than he could by a final
judgment in an unlawful detainer action. Under the new statute the
plaintiff must give the defendant a three-day notice to pay the over-
due rent or quit the premises. 4 Additionally, at the end of the three-
day notice the plaintiff may, after filing a complaint in unlawful
detainer, request a hearing to obtain the writ of immediate posses-
sion. 5 Since a written notice of a motion must be given at least
ten days before the proposed hearing is to take place,5 the period
49 Id. § 1005. "When a written notice of a motion is necessary, it must be given
at least 10 days before the time appointed for the hearing. The court, or a judge
thereof, may prescribe a shorter time."
50 Id.
51 Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1965).
The courts give eminent domain actions preference over all other civil actions in the
matter of setting for trial and hearing.
52 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1179(a) (West 1955).
53 Telephone interviews with Arthur McCarty, Assistant Chief Clerk, Los Angeles
Municipal Court, Civil Division, Oct. 29, 1969; Carol Wiedman, Supervisor, Civil
Division, Sacramento Municipal Court, Oct. 30, 1969; Patricia Pritchett, Deputy Court
Clerk, San Jose Municipal Court, Civil Division, Oct. 30, 1969.
54 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv. 1969) note 1 supra.
55 Id.
56 Id. § 1005 note 49 supra.
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must be shortened if the landlord is to have a speedy remedy. If
the court is to use its discretionary power to shorten the notice to
defendant, how much shorter can this notice be? Assume it is cut
in half, that is, the defendant is given five days rather than ten to
appear and show cause why the writ should not issue; that is still
a total of eight days from the first notice by the plaintiff until pos-
session is regained. In some California jurisdictions a landlord can
have a final judgment in an unlawful detainer action in approx-
imately thirteen days.57 Under this hypothetical five-day notice, the
hearing on the issuance of the writ would take place only five days
before trial in most California jurisdictions. Any shorter notice
than five days seems totally unrealistic. This type of summary
eviction of a tenant, undoubtedly an indigent, is far too harsh a
remedy to justify giving the landlord possession five or six days earlier
than would be granted by a final judgment on the merits. The new
statute is silent as to how much notice the defendant must have
prior to the hearing. This is a serious procedural defect, and should
have been expressly provided for by the legislature.
Scope of the Hearing
A. Solvency. The next procedural problem which the new statute
raises is the scope of the hearing. Is the hearing merely to establish
the defendant's solvency, or may he raise collateral issues? Under
the new statute defendant must establish that he has either sufficient
funds, or sufficient property that is subject to execution, "[T]o
satisfy the amount of damages sought to be recovered by the plain-
tiff."5 8 But does this include treble damages, damages to the premises,
and/or the actual rent owing? Landlords in unlawful detainer
actions usually pray for the allowed treble damages where the
tenant is wilfully holding over.59 If there is physical damage to
the premises caused by the tenant he may be liable to the landlord
in an amount sufficient to recompense him. While the statute requires
a showing of solvency it does not state whether the extent of the
tenant's solvency should include all possible elements of liability.
A statute should be clear and definite enough for a man of average
intelligence to know both his rights and liabilities.6° This statute
fails to meet that fundamental test.
57 Telephone interviews, Oct. 29-30, 1969 note 53 supra.
58 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv. 1969) note 1 supra.
59 Id. § 1174 (West 1955).
6o Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1962). "The question of
whether a statute is void for vagueness most frequently arises in criminal proceedings.
In such cases the underlying principle is said to be that no man shall be held crim-
inally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be pro-
scribed .... But the Supreme Court has also applied this principle in civil proceedings,
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The statute also states that the defendant "[M]ay file af-
fidavits on his behalf . ..and may appear and present testimony
on his behalf. . ."I' Are these affidavits and testimony restricted
to the issue of solvency, or may the defendant use these devices
to establish the actual amount owing? For example, may defendant
show that an agreement existed between plaintiff and defendant
to the effect that if defendant made certain repairs to the premises
the next rental installment would be offset by this amount? The
defendant may not raise counterclaims or cross-complaints in unlaw-
ful detainer actions as a defense.6 If he may raise such a collateral
issue at the hearing as an offset in rent, which will serve the same
purpose as a counterclaim or cross-complaint, this would be an
exception to the rule. Logically the defendant should be able to raise
such issues at the hearing; otherwise the plaintiff could pray for
damages so high that defendant's showing of solvency would be
impossible. For a tenant who has difficulty meeting his monthly
rental obligation, the slightest increase would be fatal to his ability
to establish solvency for the purposes of the hearing. If the indigent
tenant must establish that he is solvent either to the extent of treble
rent or physical damages to the premises, then the hearing is mean-
ingless. The amended statute is so vague and indefinite regarding
the degree of solvency a defendant must establish that he cannot
fully understand his liabilities under the statute.
B. Landlord's Bond. The new statute requires the landlord to post
a bond in the event the tenant should prevail at either the hearing
or in later proceedings.6" This bond is to cover "[S] uch damages...
as may be sustained by the defendant by reason of such disposses-
sion." '64 The statute is unclear as to whether he may present evidence
to show what his damages will be if he is evicted under this statute.
For example, the tenant may be able to show either that to obtain
other housing would mean a large increase in rental outlay, or that
there is no other housing available. If plaintiff must post a bond
to cover the defendant's possible damages, then the statute should
provide a method for ascertaining these damages. This is especially
true here, where the defendant cannot collect any damages over and
above the amount of the bond actually posted by the plaintiff.
and in doing so has expressly ruled that a criminal penalty need not be involved." See
also In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116 (1960) ; Connally
v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
61 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166(a) (West Cal. Leg. Serv. 1969) note 1 supra.
62 Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915) note 42 supra.




Stay and Bond: Equal Protection?
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1176 permits a stay
of proceedings pending appeal in unlawful detainer actions.65 This
stay is discretionary with the court hearing the case.66 If a stay is
granted, it will preserve the status quo until there is a final deter-
mination of the matter. Since section 1166(a) is a summary pro-
ceeding action, it is possible that section 1176 will apply if the
writ issues. That is, the right to the writ may not be absolute when
the plaintiff prevails.
If the court can stay the proceedings subsequent to the section
1166 (a) hearing until final judgment in the unlawful detainer action
is rendered, then the tenant must post a bond to cover any loss which
the landlord may sustain.67 The posting of this bond is not dis-
cretionary with the court.68 It is virtually impossible for the indigent
tenant to post such a bond.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state cannot
deny a convicted felon the right of appeal simply because he cannot
afford transcripts on which to base his bill of exceptions.69 The
basis of this decision is that one should not be deprived of the right
to appeal merely because of indigency. T0 To so deprive an indigent
defendant of the remedies available to the affluent is a violation of
the fundamental right of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
This bond requirement means that the defendant's remedy is
determined not by the merits of his case, but by the depth of his
pocket-book. Therefore, the affluent defendant is entitled to appeal,
while the indigent defendant is denied this privilege. Indigents are
entitled to equal protection of the law in civil proceedings as well as
in criminal proceedings. California is denying the indigent tenant
65 Id. § 1176 (West 1955). "An appeal taken by the defendant shall not stay pro-
ceedings upon the judgment unless the judge before whom the same was rendered
so directs."
66 See Plummer v. Agoure, 20 Cal. App. 319, 322, 128 P. 1014, 1016 (1912), in
which the court said that a stay of proceedings in unlawful detainer "[P]ending an
appeal . . . is not a matter of right . . . but one in the determination of which the
court exercises large discretionary powers ... "
67 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 917.4 (West 1955).
68 In Woods-Drury Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 2d 340, 349, 63 P.2d
1184, 1189 (1936), the court said, "As to an appeal it is discretionary with the trial
court whether a stay should be granted or refused .... Even if the trial court granted
a stay it would be in duty bound to require a statutory bond."
69 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Cf., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
70 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). "Destitute defendants must be




this protection by making the posting of a bond a requirement to
appeal in summary proceeding actions. 71
Direct Appeal
The new statute also raises the question, what procedural
remedies, if any, are available to the defendant if the court allows
the issuance of the writ. An adverse decision in a motion to show
cause is not directly appealable as it is not a judgment or a final
determination of the matter.7" By analogy, the decision in a writ of
possession hearing may not be appealable until there is a final
adjudication in the unlawful detainer trial. However, for the indigent
tenant the issuance of the writ of possession is basically the same as
a final judgment on the matter. It is highly unlikely that a defen-
dant will contest the unlawful detainer complaint. Once a defendant
is evicted, his primary concern is new housing. Locating new living
quarters in an urban area where there is already a housing short-
age73 must take precedence over contesting an eviction. Therefore, if
the decision at the hearing required under the new statute may not
be appealed and the defendant is evicted, then the decision will
actually be the same as a final determination of the matter. It is
questionable whether this was the intent of the legislature in passing
the new statute.
Writ of Prohibition
If the court should allow a stay of the proceedings and the
defendant cannot post the bond required is there any other remedy
available to him? Even if the defendant could show that to post
such a bond would create an enormous burden on him he would
71 See West Haven Housing Auth. v. Simmons, 5 Conn. Cir. R. 282, 250 A.2d
527 (1968), cert. granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3160 (Sept. 23, 1969). The defendant was be-
hind in his rent and the plaintiff brought action to recover possession of the premises.
There was a hearing on the merits and the plaintiff received a judgment for the
restoration of the premises. CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 52-542 (1960) requires appel-
lant to post a bond before the right to appeal in summary proceedings will attach. The
defendant filed an application for waiver of the security bond on grounds of in-digency, and attached affidavits to show his financial condition. The Connecticut courts
denied this request on the grounds that defendant was merely prosecuting delaying
tactics. The courts went on to say that an appeal is a statutory privilege, not a right,
and as such it is a proper function of the legislature to regulate. Defendants contend
that requiring an indigent to post a bond before appeal will be granted is a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The defendants cited
Justice Douglas' dissent to the denial of certiorari, Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037(1967). See text accompanying note 77 infra. The Supreme Court feels that this ques-
tion should be settled and has therefore granted certiorari in the West Haven Housing
Auth. case.
72 CAL. CODE CiV. PRoC. § 904.1-904.3 (West 1955).
73 Telephone interviews, Nov. 5, 1969; Nov. 13, 1969 note 9 supra.
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still have no adequate remedy at law.74 Then the defendant might be
able to obtain a writ of prohibition, which would prohibit the court
from taking any further action and would therefore stop the issuance
of the writ of possession. The courts hold that one of the grounds
for the issuance of a writ of prohibition is lack of an adequate remedy
at law.15 Assuming a writ would issue, a serious question might arise
as to whether it could be obtained rapidly enough to be an effective
remedy.
CONCLUSION
Many times in the past landlords' rights have been imposed
upon by tenants who either refused to pay rent or avoided service
of process in unlawful detainer actions. This will undoubtedly con-
tinue in the future. While the summary unlawful detainer pro-
ceedings allow the landlord an expedient means to regain his premises
when a tenant is wrongfully holding over, the writ of immediate
possession is far too harsh a remedy because it denies the tenant
certain basic rights.
The legislature has failed to include in the statute the notice
period that the plaintiff must give the defendant prior to the hear-
ing. The legislature has also failed to define the scope of the hear-
ing; it is not clear whether the hearing is merely to determine the
defendant's solvency vis-h-vis the damages prayed for by the plain-
tiff, or whether the defendant may raise collateral issues to reduce
this amount. The new statute does not prescribe a method to deter-
mine the extent of the defendant's damages should he be unjustly
evicted, in order that plaintiff may post an adequate bond. If the
hearing only covers the defendant's solvency vis-h-vis the damages
prayed for by the plaintiff, then the defendant receives no genuine
hearing and is still denied due process of law. Assuming that a
stay of proceedings is allowed under this statute, the defendant
must post a bond; this the indigent tenant cannot do. He would
thus be deprived of his fourteenth amendment right to equal pro-
tection under the law. There is nothing in the statute which permits
the defendant to prosecute a direct appeal, and it is questionable
whether a writ of prohibition would lie to prevent further action. If
a direct appeal, a stay of the proceedings and a writ of prohibition
are not available to the tenant, his only course of action will be to
74 Woods-Drury Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 2d 340, 63 P.2d 1184 (1936),
note 68 supra.
75 See Kennaley v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 512, 275 P.2d 1 (1955); Gor-
bacheff v. Justice's Court of Alameda County, 31 Cal. 2d 178, 187 P.2d 407 (1948).
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defend the unlawful detainer suit and appeal any adverse judgment.
Tenants evicted pursuant to the writ of immediate possession do
not usually defend at the trial, as the indigent tenant does notpossess the requisite resources necessary to pursue such a course
of action.
American jurisprudence is replete with instances where theindigent is denied adequate protection under the law. California's
statute on immediate possession is but one example. It appears that
our "sophisticated" legal system, when applied to the indigent tenant,has not progressed very far from the old common law where the
tenant had no legal rights vis-h-vis the landlord. The time is far
overdue for the indigent tenant to be given equal protection under
the law.
United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, dis-
senting to a denial of certiorari in Williams v. Shaffer,76 has struck a
blow for the indigent tenant in America.
The problem of housing for the poor is one of the most acute facing theNation. The poor are relegated to ghettos and are beset by substandardhousing at exorbitant rents. Because of their lack of bargaining power,
the poor are made to accept onerous lease terms .... Default judgmentsin eviction proceedings are obtained with machine-gun rapidity, since
the indigent cannot afford counsel to defend.77
It is dismaying and highly disappointing to find this progres-
sive view in a dissent. Let us hope that Justice Douglas' voice is
the voice of the future. This statute should not have been amended,
but should have been abolished.
Jeffrey G. Green
78 385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
7 Id. at 1040.
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